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PATENTS AND ANTITRUST: PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE?*

S. Chesterfield Oppenheimt
in patent law and antitrust law have become increasingly aware of the interactions of patent and antitrust policies. The view that these two sets of laws intrinsica.Jly _conflict still
persists, although it is apparently a minority position.1 It is based
on the idea that the very exclusiveness of patent rights breeds anticompetitive effects. In this connection, the patent bar is sometimes
charged with putting the gloss of history and theory on the
monopolistic nature of patented inventions.2
The report of the Attorney General's Committee3 senses no
inherent opposition between these two public policies. It subscribes to the view that they both flow from the fountainhead of
competitive enterprise and are mutual aids to its preservation.

S

PECIALISTS

• This article was originally prepared as an address before the joint meeting of the
Section of Patent, Trade-Mark and Copyright Law and the Section of Antitrust Law of
the American Bar Association at its 78th Annual Meeting at Philadelphia, August 22, 1955.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 For expressions of this viewpoint, see Hamilton and Till, "What Is a Patent?" 13
LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 245 (1948); Meyers and Lewis, "The Patent 'Franchise' and the
Antitrust Laws," 30 GEo. L.J. 117, 260 (1941-1942); Petro, "Patents: Judicial Developments and Legislative Proposals," 12 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 80, 352 (1944-1945). But see
Folk, "The Relation of Patents to the Antitrust Laws," 13 LAW & CoNTEM. PROB. 278
(1948); Stedman, "Patents and the Antitrust Laws," 31 J.P.0.S. 14 (1949); WooD, PATENTS
AND ANTITRUST LAW (1942); Rich, "Relation Between Patent Practices and the AntiMonopoly Laws," 24 J.P.O.S. 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942); Wood and Johnson, "Patents
and the Antitrust Laws," UNIV. Iu.. L. FORUM 544 (1950); OPPENHEIM, CASES oN FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAws 482-491 (1948), and articles by the same author cited note 98 infra;
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL Cm.IMl'ITE!> TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws
223-259 (1955).
In his dissenting opinion in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at
452, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1944), Justice Rutledge said: "Basically these [patent laws and antitrust
laws] are opposed in policy, the one granting rights of monopoly, the other forbidding
monopolistic activities." A former head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice has expressed a similar view. Bergson, "Patents and Antitrust Laws," Practising
Law Institute Lecture, July 20, 1949, at p. 3 (Mimeo.): "It will be helpful in our thinking
on the subject if we face frankly the fact that these two systems do conflict. It only
confuses the issue if we shut our eyes and pretend they do not." But compare Clapp,
"Some Recent Developments in Patent-Antitrust Laws," 34 J.P.O.S. 945 at 946 (1952) ("I
think it must be conceded that the concept of free competition is at least to a certain
degree in conflict with that of the patent monopoly"); and to the same effect, Hollabaugh,
"Recent Antitrust Developments Affecting Patents," UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAw SCHOOL
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 61, 63 (1953).
2 E.g., Kahn, "Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law," 30 Al\r. EcoN.
REv. 475 (1940); Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," TNEC Monograph No. 31
(1941); Rice, "Decay of Our Patent System," 5 BROOKLYN L. REv. 357 (1936).
3 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws, c. V (1955) (hereinafter referred to as the REPORT).
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Yet this does not necessarily deny the existence, in certain respects,
of a division-with patent law as one branch and antitrust as the
other. Thus, the report affirms that in some zones each of these
bodies of law has its own measures of liability for policy transgressions. An example is the report's assertion that patent misuse is
not invariably per se an antitrust violation. 4
In the year 1955 it is still clear tliat patent and antitrust policies
must be kept within their respective orbits. This requires sound
administration of their statutory standards and the intervention
of judicial interpretations designed to harmonize both policies
with the paramount goal of promoting competition. It is futile to
controvert the existence of patent-antitrust problems analyzed in
the report of the Attorney General's Committee. It has been
contended that the courts really do not resolve incompatibilities
of these policies but rather define the line where patent protection
ends and antitrust prohibition begins.5 This smacks of taking
semantic refuge in question-begging terms. The inescapable judicial task has been and will be one of reconciling private rights
within the patent law and antitrust sectors with the overriding
public interest in both areas. This is true in any situation when
the patentee is challenged for claiming competitive immunity based
upon invalid patents or for overreaching the bounds of his valid
patent grant in collision with antitrust standards. Indeed, an accommodation would still be needed if the antitrust laws did not
exist. Ever since the first Patent Act of I 790, 6 the courts have been
required to determine the scope of the patent grant in order to
prevent the restriction of rights in which the public at large is
entitled to share.7
It is timely to take stock of congressional and judicial attitudes toward patent rights in the larger setting of private competitive enterprise policies of which antitrust is an integral part. This
paper is limited to aspects directly and substantially related to the
legal status and protection of patent rights from the standpoint of
their business utilization, and from the standpoint of their immunity from, or impact upon, antitrust prohibitions. There are many
technical patent law problems of no antitrust relevance just as
4 REPORT

254.

5 Diggins, "The Patent-Antitrust Problem,"
6 Act of April 10, 1790, c. 7, 1 Stat. L. 109.

53

M1cH.

L. REv. 1093 (1955).

7For illustrative early cases, see Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 1 (1829); Grant
v. Raymond, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 218 (1832); Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. (45 U.S.) 645 (1846);
Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 322 (1858); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192,
2 S.Ct. 225 (1882).
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there are antitrust issues of no patent law significance. These lie
outside the scope of this discussion.
My thesis for this paper is based upon developments which
appear, as of 1955, to bring into clearer focus the process by which
the earned differential advantages of patent rights are being adjusted to the prohibitory dixits of antitrust law. This is part of
the never-ending governmental function of balancing stability of
legal rights against the desired flexibility resulting from evolutionary growth. We can only chart the directions of the current
trends. Generalizations from this panorama should not be overdrawn or artificially simplified. Both the patent and antitrust
spectra are arranged in degrees. The edges of certainty are blurred
in areas where the law continues to adjust itself to technological
economic growth. Despite these caveats, however, I do not mean
to underrate the increased clarification of the appointed provinces
of patent and antitrust policies. This clarification is emerging from
what has occurred since the 1930's when patent laws and the Patent
System began to be subjected to accusations of organic deficiencies
in their underlying theory and operations-criticisms that went
beyond instances of misuse of patent rights. 8
Let us begin this synthesis with some generalizations and
searching questions. At the same time let us bear in mind that the
patent-antitrust picture is seen through contracted vision because
opinion necessarily· mixes with demonstrable facts in the value
judgments any observer may make.9
•
First, the judicial trend in the main shows rejection of assaults
upon the fundamentals of the patent grant. Congress and the
courts still regard the patent as a public welfare monopoly which
is limited in time and scope in order to keep it geared to the
mechanisms of competition. An exception to this trend is the
mutation of doctrine with respect to the standards of invention.
s See Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," TNEC Monograph No. 31 (1941);
Petro, "Patents: Judicial Developments and Legislative Proposals," 12 UNIV. Cm:. L. R.Ev.
80, 352 (1944-1945): Rice, "Decay of Our Patent System," 5 BROOKLYN L. REv. 357 (1936);
Feuer, "The Patent Privilege and the TNEC Proposals," 14 TEMPLE L.Q. 180 (1940);
Frank, "What's Wrong With Our Patent System?" SAT. EVE. PoST, Nov. 28, 1942; Kahn,
"Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law," 30 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 475 (1940);
Ogburn and Thomas, "Are Inventions Inevitable?" 37 POL. Sci. Q. 83 (1922); GILFILLAN,
THE SocIOLOGY OF INVENTION (1935); Gilfillan, "Social Principles of Invention," 17 J.P.O.S.
216 (1935); Arnold, "The Abuse of Patents," 24 J.P.O.S. 531 (1942) [but see Langner, "We
Depend on Inventions, An Answer to Thurman Arnold," 24 J.P.O.S. 545 (1942)]; Watkins
and Stocking, "Patent Monopolies and Free Enterprise," 3 VAND. L. R.Ev. 729 (1950).
9 Footnote documentation of the author's conclusions is supplied in other parts of this
article.
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Second, there is a trend toward the intermediate position that,
in balancing patents and antitrust, patents are not to be viewed
either as the root of all evils or the source of all benefits in maintaining the goal of a creative competitive society.
Third, certain rulings of the courts have been made in the
shadowy areas where solution of novel and borderland issues of
patent-antitrust policies are more likely to be exploratory and
tentative rather than the crystallization of long-run doctrinal directions of either of these public policy branches.
Fourth, there recently appears to be greater sophistication in
administration and enforcement of patent and antitrust policies.
This may be the pathway to separating from the proper functions
of government, within constitutional and statutory bounds, the
ideological criticism which brings into question premises of the
patent laws and the Patent System. Government antitrust agencies
and the courts are awakening to this tendency to avoid the circumvention of the law's commands which results from the espousal of
patent and antitrust reforms which should be left to Congress.
These characterizations of trends are the basis for inviting
attention to certain fundament~l considerations which appear to
underlie the accommodation of patent rights to antitrust doctrines
within the range of each of the foregoing conclusions. These are
phrased as guiding questions which this paper seeks to answer.
One question is whether patent rights are receiving "hard core"
legal protection consonant with constitutional and statutory edicts
of patent policy and hence not contrary to antitrust criteria-that
is to say, whether the courts have given effect to the standards of
invention which Congress intended to be compatible with the
constitutional purpose, and whether, after the patent issues, they
'have tended to accord patent rights the full measure of reward
within the ambit of valid patent grants.
Another question is whether patent policy enforcement against
misuse and antitrust enforcement against patent abuses have been
generally kept within the bounds of "hard core" violations of each
policy.
Next, on the frontiers where novel issues constantly arise, have
the courts kept faith with both patent and antitrust axioms without inhibiting the growth of the law and its capacity to conform
itself to dynamic- forces?
Finally, have the branches of law under discussion been canalized within banks to keep patent and antitrust from overflowing
into ideologies beyond congressional directives? In other words,
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have the courts avoided premises and standards of ideologies at
odds with those embodied in our private competitive system?
In explaining these trends and in answering these questions
we turn to the evidence at hand.

"Hard Core" Protection
Despite some striking attempts to cut out the heart of patent
rights, there is no substantial evidence of a drift away from judicial
protection of the "hard core" of the patent grant. This conclusion
may surprise the reader at first because a few dramatic deviations
from traditional safeguards of patent rights, or judicial dicta, may
have deflected attention from the march qf decisional law and the
facts of particular cases. A. dispassionate examination of judicial
trends since the 1930's will disclose few breaches in patent law
policy. In this appraisal we must exclude every adjudicated case
where the court found genuine patent misuse or antitrust abuse,10
since these do not shrink the legitimate sphere of lawful patent
rights.
The following illustrations highlight the previously stated generalization that the beating drums of the critics have not persuaded
the Supreme Court and other federal courts, or the Congress, that
the limited time monopoly exclusiveness of the patent grant tends
to undermine the foundations of a competitive economy.
There is no decision, apart from the effects of compulsion to
license as an antitrust remedy in litigated or consent decrees, in
direct contradiction of the historic concept of the patent grant as
conferring the right to exclude everyone from making, using or
vending the patented invention without permission of the patentee.
Section 154 of the Patent Act of 195211 now removes any doubt
that this right of exclusion was always intended as an addition to
the common law primordial right of an inventor to make, use and
sell the invention. The code explicitly provides that every patent
shall contain " . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns,
for the term of seventeen years, of the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States . . . . "
In recent years there has been questioning of the concept of
the patent as a property right. This came from writers who preferred the notion that the patent is "a private stake in the public
10 See notes 52-69 infra.
1135 u.s.c. (1952) §154.
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domain," 12 a public franchise, or a certificate of convenience and
necessity,13 as in the public utility regulation field. You will not
find any unequivocal judicial countenance of these heresies.
Standing firm is the Supreme Court's affirmation in Hartford
Empire: "That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by individuals and the government, has long been settled."14 This should render ineffectual any attempt to devitalize
this property concept by capitalizing on the frequent Supreme
Court references to the patent as a privilege conditioned by a
public purpose.15 It also subordinates vacillations in Justice
Douglas' characterizations on this point, in wliich Justice Black
concurred. In Special Equipment Company/6 Justice Douglas
observed that a patent is not to be considered as just another form
of property, but two years later in Transparent-Wrap, 11 he flatly
asserted that a patent is a species of property. Again, to .remove all
doubt, the Patent Act of 1952 added a declaratory provision that
"patents shall have the attributes of personal property."18
Congressional intention to translate the precepts of the constitutional provision into patent" fundamentals traces its ancestry
to the. first law of 1790 and its descendants.19 Despite the ever
present risk that the courts may misread congressional intention
in the revised paragraphs of this latest act, there is cogent evidence
that Congress has placed itself on the side of "hard core" protection of the patent grant. This should counteract the denuding
effect attributed to a few judicial frolics and detours of which Congress apparently took notice in making certain revisions designed
to remove obscurities.
12 Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," TNEC Monograph No. 31 at p. 51
(1941).
18 Meyers and Lewis, "The Patent 'Franchise' and the Antitrust Laws," 30 GEo. L. J.
II7, 260 (1941-1942): and see concurring opinion of Frank, J., in Picard v. United Aircraft
Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632 at 645.
14 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 415, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1944). For
early cases, see Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. (45 U.S.) 645 at 674 (1846); Consolidated
Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92 at 96 (1876).
15 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid•Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 at 666, 64 S.Ct. 268
(1944); Douglas, J., dissenting in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 at 382, 65
S.Ct. 741 (1945). Cf. description of patents as "public franchises" in Seymour v. Osborne,
II Wall. (78 U.S.) 516 at 533 (1870).
.
16 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 65 S.Ct. 741 (1945).
17 Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes 8: Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 67 S.Ct. 610
(1947).
18 35 u.s.c. (1952) §261.
19 For discussions of legislation prior to the 1952 Patent Code, and of legislative
history and intent behind the 1952 code, see Federico, "Commentary on the New Patent
Act," 35 U.S.C.A. I-70 (1954); Harris, "Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent
of the Patent Act of 1952," 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 658 (1955),
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One group of such revised provisions relates to what is invention and the cognate presumption of validity upon issuance of the
patent grant.20 These have special pertinence to possible antitrust implications. It is axiomatic that an invalid patent cannot
be used to exclude others from the practice or marketing of the
invention.21 Since an invalid patent has no legal inception, the
conduct of the claimant, subsequent to knowledge of invalidity,
must be tested by antitrust standards applicable to unpatented subject matter. This may convert into antitrust violation conduct
that would otherwise have been reasonably ancillary to a lawful
patent grant. For this reason,_ crucial importance attaches to a
determination of patent validity and the adjunct presumption of
validity arising from issuance of the grant.
A key provision is section I 03 of the new code entitled "Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter."22 This
section states two criteria of invention not previously made explicit.
First, there is a clear statutory bar to obtaining a patent on subject
matter which "would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art." Second,
there is the mandate that "patentability shall not be negatived by
the manner in which the invention was made."
The House Report referred to section I 03 as one of two "major
changes or innovations"23 in the former law. Nonobviousness as
a negative test of invention was doubtless intended to reduce the
mysticism of what constitutes invention. It still remains to be
seen whether this part of the revised section offers words of promise
only to be broken by misconceived judicial interpretation.24 More
20 35
21 Cf.

u.s.c.

(1952) §282.
the licensee estoppel cases, in which the Supreme Court has created an exception
to the usual rule estopping patent licensees from challenging validity of the licensed
patents, where the license involves a price fixing provision. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson
Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 63 S.Ct. 172 (1942); Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic
Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 67 S.Ct. 416 (1947); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg.
Co., 329 U.S. 402, 67 S.Ct. 421 (1947). As stated by the Court in the Sola case (at 175),
"a restriction [in a patent license agreement] on the price of articles entering interstate
commerce is a violation of the Sherman Act save only as it is within the protection of a
lawfully granted patent monopoly." And d. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364 at 386, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1947) ("Appellees admit that in the absence of whatever
protection is afforded by valid patents the licensing arrangements described would be in
violation of the Sherman Act.").
22 35 U.S.C. (1952) §103. Analysis of this provision is presented in Schramm, "The
Relationship of the Patent Act of 1952 to the Antitrust Laws," 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 36
at 43-47 (1954); Federico, "Commentary on the New Patent Act,'' 35 U.S.C.A. I at 19-23
(1954); Harris, "Some Aspects of the Underlying Intent of the Patent Act of 1952,'' 23
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 658 at 671-680 (1955).
23 H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 5 (1952).
24 Opinions containing statements to the effect that Congress merely codified existing
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objective in character is the sentence of section I 03 which is designed to lay at rest the ghost of the "flash of creative genius" test,
enunciated by Justice Douglas in the Cuno case, 25 and made more
ominous by his misreading of history and his flight toward pure
subjectivity of invention in the Great A & P case.26 On this point,
in the words of the House Report, "it is immaterial whether [ an
invention] resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a
flash of genius."27 . There is impelling evidence that Congress intended to stabilize the concept of invention. It was aware of the
overly critical judicial attitµde toward patent validity reflected in
Cuno and Great A & P and the rash of decisions labeled by Judge
Learned Hand as a "pronounced new doctrinal trend" 28 toward a
higher standard of invention. The House Report declared that
section 103 "should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great
departures which have appeared in some cases. " 29 More promise,
and certainly not a broken hope, is foreshadowed in Judge Learned
Hand's most recent observation on section 103 in Lyon v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co.80 With characteristic grasp of the judicial
process, he_ said:
. "In the first place §103 only restores the original gloss,
substantially in ipsissimis verbis; which has never been overruled; but on the contrary for seventy or eighty years had
decisional law with respect to the applicable standard of invention are collected in Harris,
"Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952," 23 GEO.
WASH. L. R.Ev. 658 at 661, n. 14 (1955). See also Interstate Rubber Products Corp. v.
Radiator Specialty Co., (4th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 546 at 549 ("As stated in the Senate
and House Reports during the enactment of the statute by Congress and in recent decisions
of the courts, the provisions of §103 merely codified the law laid down by the courts
during the past hundred years, and were added to the statute for purposes of uniformity
and definiteness.").
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 62 S.Ct. 37 (1941).
Great Atlantic &: Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147,
71 S.Ct. 127 (1950).
27 H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 18 (1952). For earlier judicial comment to the
same effect, see Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. (18 U.S.) 248 at 269 (1851).
28 Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632 at 636. For collection
of Supreme Court cases invalidating patents for lack of invention in the 1933-1938 period,
see dissenting opinion of Judge Edgerton in Carbide &: Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. Coe,
(D.C. Cir. 1938) 102 F. (2d) 236 at 245, n. 10. Cases subsequent to 1938 frequently cited
as raising the standard of invention include Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 62 S.Ct. 37 (1941); Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v.
United States, 320 U.S. I, 63 S.Ct. 1393 (1943); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 68 S.Ct. 440 (1948); Jungersen v. Ostby &: Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 69
S.Ct. 269 (1949); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340
U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct. 127 (1950). See comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 609 (1951); Prager, "Standards
of Patentable Invention from 1474 to 1952," 20 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 69 (1952).
29 H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 7 (1952).
80 (2d Cir. 1955) 106 U.S.P.Q. 1 at 7.
25
26
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continued to be regarded as authoritative. Moreover-and this
is the important consideration-although it may have ceased
in practice to be followed, and had come to enjoy no more
than lip service, there never has been the slightest intimation
of any definite substitute; nothing more than an unexpressed
and unacknowledged misgiving about the increased facility
with which patents were being granted. Such judicial attitudes are indeed the stuff of which much of the law is made;
but we cannot agree that, however controlling upon the lower
courts, they are a warrant for that solid assurance, the disappointment of which will make a statute invalid. Courts again
and again shift their position; and, although they are apt to
do so under cover of nice distinctions, they impose the risk of
anticipating the changes upon those who may have acted upon
the faith of the original. Certainly a legislature, whose will
the courts have undertaken to proliferate, must be free to
reinstate the courts' initial interpretation, even though it may
have been obscured by a series of later comments whose upshot
is at best hazy."
"Hard core" protection of valid patents should not give a haven
to patents which have congenital weakness in failing to meet the
requirements of patentability. In this regard, competitive policy
has legitimate ground for scrutiny. Patents that cannot measure
up to what the patent bar itself would recognize as meritorious inventions should not be permitted to cut down the area of open
competitive markets, or prove a base for exacting the rewards of
exclusiveness to which only valid patents are entitled. This is
primarily a problem of giving wholehearted support in funds and
personnel to the Patent Office examining corps. Standards of invention applied at this issuance source can rise no higher than their
level in adequacy of the Patent Office examiners who, despite
frequent underpay and overwork, have faithfully attempted to keep
abreast of technological developments in examining the multifarious arts.
Another move in the direction of making the patent grant
firmer appears in section 282 of the 1952 code, where the statute
declares, for the first time since 1793, that "a patent shall be presumed valid. TJ;ie burden of establishing invalidity of a patent
shall rest on a party asserting it."31 While this presumption had,
3135 U.S.C. (1952) §282. See note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 575 (1953); Harris, "Some
Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952," 23 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 658 at 680-683 (1955); Schramm, "The Relationship of the Patent Act of 1952 to the
Antitrust Laws," 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 36 at 53-56 (1954).

208

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54-

of course, been recognized in many early cases as an application of
the general rule according presumptive validity to decisions of
administrative officers, it had been diluted, and even ignored, in
cases in recent years.32 This evoked Justice Jackson's famous
dissenting remark that "the only patent that is valid is one which
this Court ~as not been able to get its hands on." 33 In taking
cognizance of this climate of judicial opinion, Congress expressly
restated the presumptive validity of the patent. The proper
stature of meritorious patents should be more securely established
if the courts perceptively interpret this provision,34 particularly
in conjunction with section· 103, which provides the criterion of
"nonobvious subject matter" for invention.
"Hard core" protection has also been displayed in recent judicial pronouncements that the mere acquisition of a valid patent, or
mere aggregation of patents is not itself illegal monopolization in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The monopoly exclusiveness of the valid patent, whether basic or improvement, and
even though deliberately obtained or maintained with the purpose
to exercise the right to exclude all others, is as such immune from
antitrust prosecution. 35 When valid patents are accumulated under on~ ownership or control, that also is not per se an antitrust
violation. 36 This obviously contributes clarification by requiring
the government or private parties to prove the plus elements of
abuse of the valid patents, an illegal purpose or plan in their acquisition by grant, purchase or grant back, or a specific intent to
monopolize beyond the lawful patent grants. 37
32 See Jarozzi Bros., Inc. v. Berkeley Pump Co., (9th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2<l) 632 at 634
("The presumption of validity of administrative grant has been in recent years almost
.reduced to nullity in patent cases''); Ginsberg v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., (D.C. N.Y.
1947) 72 F. Supp. 43 at 44 ("It may now well be said that no presumption whatever arises
from the grant of a patent"). See note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 575 (1953).
33 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 at 572, 69 S.Ct. 269 (1949).
34 See Harris, "Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act
of 1952," 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 658 (1955).
35 REPORT 226; United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) 118
F. Supp. 41 at 214, probable jurisdiction noted 348 U.S. 806 (1954). Cf. Automatic Radio
Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 70 S.Ct. 894 (1950). See Handler, "An
Examination of the Chapter on Patent Antitrust Problems in the Attorney General's
Committee Report," 1 ANTITRU5r BULLETIN 157 at 158 (1955).
36 United States v. L. D. Caulk Co., (D.C. Del. 1954) 126 F. ·Supp. 693; Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 70 S.Ct. 894 (1950). Cf. United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295, affd. per
curiam 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699 (1954). And see United States v. General Electric Co.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989 at 1015.
37 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989; REPORT
227. See also cases cited in notes 57-69.
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Excluding the element of combination or conspiracy on the
horizontal level of agreement, the courts have not yielded to the
insistent efforts, coming to a head in the TNEC Final Report, 38 to
dilute the full measure of the reward to which the patentee has
been deemed entitled. The courts have not disturbed decisions
approving limitations in individual patent licenses with respect to
first sale price,39 quantity,40 field of use41 and territory.42 Onslaughts on this rationale of normal and reasonable reward, derived
basically from the 1926 General Electric case, 'have thus failed to
convert such limitations into either patent law or antitrust violations, so long as the patentee stays within the metes and bounds of
the claims of the patent.
It is also apparent that the combined effect of the Paper Bag4 3
and Special Equipment Company 44 cases, when read with section
154 of the 1952 Patent Act, evinces congressional intention to exercise its powers under the constitutional clause without imposing
on the patentee a compulsion to license, if he does not himself use
the patent. This "hard core" protection principle may be limited
by a doctrine of unreasonable nonuse, vaguely foreshadowed in
the Paper Bag and Special Equipment cases. This would support
the Attorney General's Committee's observation that mere patent
nonuse is neutral but, when unreasonable, it may constitute patent
misuse as well as serve as the instrumentality for antitrust violation
when the plus antitrust elements are present.45 It should therefore
put to rest the erroneous view that Paper Bag sanctioned outright
suppression of a technologically meritorious patented invention
capable of being worked on a commercially practicable scale.
38 S. Doc.
39 United

35, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941) at 36, 269.
States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926). See United
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948). But see Newburgh Moire
Co. v. Superior Moire Co., (D.C. N.J. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 372.
40 Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., (7th Cir. 1907) 154 F.
358, app. dismissed 210 U.S. 439, 28 S.Ct. 764 (1908).
41 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124, 59 S.Ct. 116
(1938). Cf. Vulcan Mfg. Co. v. Maytag Co., (8th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 136, cert. den. 294
U.S. 734, 55 S.Ct. 403 (1935).
42 Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., (9th Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 121. See Adams
v. Burke, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 453 (1873); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659,
15 S.Ct. 738 (1895); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., (6th Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 267.
43 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 28 S.Ct. 748
(1908).
44 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 65 S.Ct. 741 (1945).
45 REPORT 229-231. Cf. Frost, "Legal Incidents of Non-Use of Patented Inventions
Reconsidered," 14 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 273, 435 (1946); Stemple, "Non-User of Paper
Patents,'' 34 J.P.O.S. 23 (1952); Powell, "The Exclusive Right of the Patentee-Should the
Right to Exclude Others Be Dependent on Sale or Licensing by the Patentee?" 58 HARv.
L. R.Ev. 726 (1945).
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"Hard Core" Violations
Of coordinate importance with "hard core" protection of lawful patent rights is <;:ondemnation of "hard core" violations of
either patent or antitrust policy. As stated at the beginning of
this paper, drawing the line between these categories may involve
discriminating judgment and a sensitive balance. Exactitude of
a slide rule is a delusory expectation. Yet it is generally recognized
that there are certain practices which cannot be defended in the
name of patents. Motion Picture Patents4 6 laid the foundation
stones of patent misuse as a violation of patent law policy. The
Supreme Court from the Bement41 and Winslow 48 cases to date
demarcated patent and antitrust areas. It is fair to conclude that
the whole body of Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions
has appreciably contributed to clarification in identifying and
measuring the scope of genuine patent misuse and antitrust abuses.
On the Supreme Court level, exceptions to this generalization are
the Mercoid cases49 and the confusing expressions in certain Supreme Court opinions equating patent misuse and patent tying
clauses to a per se antitrust violation.50 Excluded also from this
analysis are boundary cases of first impression which may pose
problems in growth areas for which the solution may at first be
quite obscure.
In the areas where authentic instances of patent misuse and
antitrust abuse have been crystallized into "hard core" violations,
both the patent and antitrust bars should have no qualms in subscribing to the Attorney General's Committee's forthright approval
of the outlawing of such transgressions.51 Government and practitioners have a common goal in curbing these abuses. Motion
Picture Patents} 2 Carbice,53 Leitch,54 Morton Salt55 and B. B.
46 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 S.Ct. 416
(1917).
47 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 22 S.Ct. 747 (1902).
48 United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 33 S.Ct. 253 (1913).
49 Mercoid Corp v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 64 S.Ct. 278 (1944).
50 Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 at 684, 64
S.Ct. 278 (1944). Cf. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 at 396, 68 S.Ct.
12 (1947); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953).
51 REPORT, c. V.
52 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 S.Ct. 416
(1917).
53 Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 51
S.Ct. 334 (1931).
54 Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 288 (1938).
55 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942).
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Chemical56 are supportable patent misuse cases. The Mercoid
cases are, in my opinion, exceptions. In the antitrust area of combination or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade and attempts to monopolize through abuse of patent rights, the courts,
since 1936, have defined a number of "hard core" violations. Illustrative cases, viewed from the standpoint of proof of violation
rather than the remedies decreed by the court, are Ethyl Gasoline,67
Vehicular Parking,5 8 Masonite,5 9 Hartford-Empire, 60 National
Lead,61 United States Gypsum,62 General Electric Lamp63 and
Carboloy 64 cases, Imperial Chemical Industries,66 Besser Manufacturing,66 New Wrinkle,C 1 Kobe v. Dempsey 68 and Associated Patents.69 Aside from the dedication of patents in the General Electric Lamp case, none of these cases need disturb those who fear
deterioration of patent law fundamentals through the judicial
process. In 1955 this can be seen i!l calmer and clearer perspective.
It was not these successful patent misuse and antitrust prosecutions
that primarily accounted for the gale of criticism from the patent
bar. Rather it was the ideological assault on the fundamentals of
patent laws and the Patent System. 70 This assault occurred during
the very period when the antitrust division was engaged in a systematic and more intensified scrutiny of patent-antitrust abuses.
This scrutiny in turn generated a tendency to find in genuine
antitrust fact situations the aura of an anti-patent government
attitude.
Corporate bigness in patents is not per se an evil, and bigness
should be carefully distinguished from monopolization.71 Yet the
56

B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 62 S.Ct. 406 (1942).

57 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 S.Ct. 618 (1940).
58 United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., (D.C. Del. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 828.
59 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S.Ct. 1070 (1942).
60 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1944).
61 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947).
62 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948).
63 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753.
64 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989.
65 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 100 F.

Supp.

504.
66 Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343
67 United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.,

U.S. 444, 72 S.Ct. 838 (1952).
342 U.S. 371, 72 S.Ct. 350 (1952); (D.C. Ohio

1955) 1955 Trade Cases ,r67,883.
68 Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., (10th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 416, cert. den. 344
U.S. 837, 73 S.Ct. 46 (1952). Cf. Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., (10th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d)
924 at 935-936.
69 Associated Patents, Inc. v. United States, (D.C. Mich. 1955), 1955 Trade Cases
fi68,092.
70 See note 8 supra.
71 See notes 35-37 supra.
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thought may be ventured that corporations are sometimes too
ambitious in swelling patent portfolios with a mass of patents for
"insurance" purposes in the race of competitive rivalry in inventions. Consideration might be given to the mutual benefits an
industry may reap through a sense of foresighted self-restraint
regarding corporate massing of many "deadwood" patents at the
expense of a portfolio made up of high-quality patents. It is a
question of avoiding an over-drive in competition in patents and
recognizing that excessive concentration of patents may invite
special scrutiny by antitrust enforcement agencies.

Borderland Issues
In the growth of any branch of the law, there are bound to be
stages when the courts plant seeds in cases of first impression which
may or may not sprout into firm. precedents. This is illustrated in
the patent-antitrust field by decisions or dicta which have not yet
come to maturity in balancing the private and public interests
to be secured within the limits of policy standards.
The Mercoid cases provide one example. There is no need to
traverse familiar ground amply covered in law review critiques of
this- spasmodic effect upon the contributory infringement doctrine.72 The Attorney General's Committee properly emphasized
"the need for limitations upon the scope of the misuse doctrine to
place contributory infringement in the proper context of joint
tort rules generally." 73 Again the Patent Code of 1952 purports
to counteract the effects of Justice Douglas' animadversions on this
historic remedy for actively inducing patent infringement. Section 271, particularly subsections (c) and (d),74 should make of
contributory infringement more than the residuum Justice Douglas thought the Mercoid. rationale left for a treasure hunt. It may
well be said that section 271, in the words of the Attorney General's
72 E.g., Wood, "The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications," 13 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 61
(1944); Frost, "Patent Infringement and the Public Interest," 12 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 345
(1944); Waite, "Has The Doctrine of Contributory Infringement Been Repudiated?" 42
MICH. L. REv. 915 (1944); Powell, "Use of Common-Law Techniques and Remedies in
Statutory Enforcement-A Study in Judicial Behavior,'' 57 HARV. L. REv. 900 (1944); Wiles,
"Joint Trespasses on Patent Property,'' 30 A.B.A.J. 454 (1944); Mathews, "Contributory
Infringement and the Mercoid Case," 27 J.P.O.S. 260 (1945); comment, 39 ILL. L. REv.
55 (1944); Rich, "Contributory Infringement,'' 31 J.P.O.S. 449 (1949); Eastman, "Contributory Infringement and the Combination Patent,'' 48 MICH. L. REv. 183 (1949).
73 REPORT 252.
74 35 U.S.C. (1952) §271. See Rich, "Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent
Act of 1952," 21 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 521 (1953); Frost, "Misuse of Patents in Relation to
the Patent Code,'' UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAw SCHOOL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAws 7I (1953); note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1953).
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Committee, reflects "reasonable expressions of Congressional intention"70 to clarify these points: (a) an express sanction of contributory infringement and an affirmation that resort to that action is
not in itself patent misuse; and (b) a cutting down of the breadth
of the Mercoid case implications, so that if the unpatented element
of a patented combination is the heart of the invention and has no
other substantial use, contributory infringement relief would not
be denied. It is hoped that the Dr. Salsbury' s Laboratories76 decision, in its confusing interpretations of section 271, will not set off
a nullification of the congressional objective of making contributory infringement a meaningful remedy.
Associated with the second Mercoid case are dicta of Justice
Douglas which would invariably equate patent misuse with per se
antitrust violation.77 This is another thrust of liability to which
the patentee should not be subjected. An owner of patent rights
should be answerable for antitrust misdeeds when, as in the case
of any other mvner of property, his conduct transgresses the standards of the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission or Clayton Acts,
as distinct from subversion of the public policy underlying the
patent grant.
Another cognate border question is whether the patentee
should be adjudged guilty of patent misuse only when the patent
is itself the efficient instrumentality of the challenged business
practice. Exclusive dealing arrangements or price discrimination
in violation of the Clayton Act may be practiced in marketing
patented products but this alone would not necessarily make the
conduct attributable solely or substantially to misuse of the patent
covering the product.78
Still another quirk on the edges of misuse is the notion that
every patent is a dynamo for generating market power requisite
to antitrust illegality. This has been given credence and authority
in the tying clause cases. 79 The Attorney General's Committee
253.
Salsbury's Laboratories v. I. D. Russell Co. Laboratories, (8th Cir. 1954) 212 F.
(2d) 414, cert. den. 348 U.S. 837, 75 S.Ct. 50 (1954).
77 Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 at 684, 64
S.Ct. 278 (1944).
78 REPORT 251. See F. C. Russell Co. v. Comfort Equipment Corp., (7th Cir. 1952) 194
F. (2d) 592; F. C. Russell Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co., (D.C. N.J. 1954) ll9 F. Supp.
II9, affd. (3d Cir. 1955), 1955 Trade Cases '1!68,177.
79 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947); TimesPicayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 601, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953); United States
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 522, 68 S.Ct. II07 (1948). But see Standard Oil Co.
of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 at 307, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949) (".•• A patent,
75 REPORT

76 Dr.
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asserts that the market leverage of a patent depends on an examination of the entire factual market context.80 This properly allows for
weighing the qualitative importance of the patent and the presence
or absence of competitive substitutes in patented or unpatented
subject matter.
Other doctrines still in the margin of development and hence
not fully integrated are merely mentioned here. Non-coercive
package licensing for legitimate business purposes is still in flux
because of the absence of case law marking out its scope and limitations.81 Questions still remain as to what amounts to a unilateral
refusal to deal in less than the package, what are elements of duress
with respect to the package versus per piece royalty rates, and the
extent to which the package licensor is obligated to assist a prospective licensee in selecting the patents making up the package.
The lawful limits of grant backs have not yet been established
by precedents which spell out the implications of TransparentW rap 82 and, at the same time, are separated from the antitrust
remedial aspects with which the grant back has figured in a number of cases.83 Other unsettled questions concern the legal criteria
for interchange of patent rights, relating to administration and
operations of the interchange. These have not been fully clarified
in the Oil Cracking Process case84 and subsequent cases applying
its Rule-of-Reason rationale.85 Connected with this is the need for
clarification of doctrine applicable to a simple cross-license to
moreover, although in fact there may be many competing substitutes for the patented
article, is at least prima facie evidence of ... [market] •.. control.'').
80 REPORT 238.
81See REPORT 239-240; note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61 (1952).
82 Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 67 S.Ct. 610
(1947).
83 Compare United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835
at 847; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at
409; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945) with United
:States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 359, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947). And see United
:States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989 at 1005; United States v.
General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753 at 815; and United States v. E. I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 41 at 151, 154, 158, 224 (cases
in which grant backs were considered as one factor in determining whether there was
antitrust violation). See also Houdry Process Corp. v. Sinclair Refining Corp., (D.C. Pa.
1954) 121 F. Supp. 320; Modem Art Printing Co. v. Skeels, (D.C. N.J. 1954) 123 F. Supp.
426 at 433.
84 Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 S.Ct. 421 (1931). See
notes, 50 CoL. L. REv. 1113 (1950); 17 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 357 (1950).
85 Cutter_ Laboratories v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., (9th Cir. 1949) 179 F. (2d) 80;
Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., (4th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 550.
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determine when its purpose and effect promote rather than lessen
competition in the line of art. It has seemed to me that Line
Material86 blurred rather than clarified the distinction between the
vertical and horizontal relationships of a simple cross-license agr~ement.
Another area not yet completely mapped is the range of exceptions to the general rule estopping licensees and assignors to
deny the validity of licensed or assigned patents. This pro?lem is
illustrated by the Sola,87 Scott Paper,88 Katzinger,89 MacGregor, 90
Hazeltine,91 and National Transformer9 2 and Hall Laboratories9 3
cases. This area will probably continue to undergo case-by-case
development, particularly in view of the new statutory presumption of validity.94 A related question of undefined bounds is the
standing of the government to attack the validity of patents in an
antitrust proceeding, discussed in the first Gypsum case.95
Finally, there are unresolved borderland questions of use of
patents in the foreign commerce field. The overall unlawful purpose and means found in cases such as National Lead06 and I mperial Chemical Industries9 7 did not call upon the courts to adjudicate
the legality of restraints within the claims of valid patents and rea86 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948).
87 Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 63 S.Ct. 172 (1942).
88 Scott Paper Co. v. l\farcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 66 S.Ct. 101 (1945).
89 Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 67 S.Ct. 416 (1947).
90 MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 67 S.Ct. 421 (1947).
91Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 70 S.Ct. 894
(1950).
92 National Transformer Corp. v. France Mfg. Co., (6th Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 343.
93 Hall Laboratories v. National Aluminate Corp., (3d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 303.
94 35 u.s.c. (1952) §282.
95 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 at 386, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948).
96 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947).
97 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 504.
See REPORT 84-86.
Still controversial is the question whe~er compulsory licensing royalty-free is within
the Sherman Act remedies when antitrust violation is found. A majority of the Attorney
General's Committee deemed this remedy "beyond the Sherman Act's authority to 'prevent
and restrain' violations." A substantial minority of committee members disagreed with
this position. The pros and cons are presented in the REPORT 255-259. The majority of
the committee, while recognizing the difficulties "inherent in compulsory licensing at
reasonable rates," felt it is settled that this remedy can be decreed but that it "should be
employed in accord with relevant standards for use of divestiture," as stated at 355-356 of
the Report. For other discussions, see Seegert, "Compulsory Licensing By Judicial ActionA Remedy for Misuse of Patents," 47 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1949); notes, 19 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 400 (1951); 56 YALE L.J. 77 (1946). Compare Stedman, "Patent and Trade-Mark
Relief in Antitrust Judgments," IO FED. B.J. 260 (1949).
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sonably ancillary to a lawful main purpose. This still leaves a void
in the case law.

Ideological Currents
This brings us to the last category of developments, namely,
ideological zones of thought drifting away from the orbits of "hard
core" protection of lawful patent rights, condemnation of "hard
core" antitrust violations, and normal borderland questions. We
refer to the realm of premises and standards outside the declared
congressional and judicial precepts of competitive enterprise. This
writer has previously referred to the school of thought which would
resolve all doubts against validity and scope of patent rights-on the
fallacious premise that they are intrinsically in opposition to the
public interest in open markets.98 This assumption, bolstered by
instances of patent misuse and antitrust abuse, has, we believe,
been the source of the ideological attacks upon patents in the late
1930's and the 1940's.99 Judicial notice of this was taken by Judge
Jerome Frank when he warned against succumbing to the "monopoly phobia," which, like mo_st phobias, he said, is "both a symptom
and a cause of a neurotic tendency which, in refusing bravely to
face facts, cannot yield intelligent advice."100 He also cautioned
that by a process of "osmosis" trade-marks and other forms of
industrial and intellectual property would be affected by this ideological current.101 Even one as understanding of patent rights as
Judge Learned Hand suggested, "Perhaps the [patent] system is
outworn.... " 102
From the survey of trends traced•in this paper, it seems that the
principal reason for the brooding of the patent bar over certain
developments since the 1930's has been the ideological variances
from the fundamentals of patent laws and the Patent System. This
has tended to obscure the rather promising record of congressional
and judicial balance and respect for the fitting of patent law into
a workable patent and antitrust policy aimed at a workable competition policy.103 In saying this, there is no intention to minimize
98 See "The Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property," 40 TRADE MARK REP. 613 at 614-617 (1950); "A New Approach to Evaluation of the
American Patent System," 33 J.P.O.S. 555, 564-565 (1951).
99 See note 8 supra.
100 Standard Brands v. Smidler, (2d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 34 at 42.
101 Id. at 41.
102 Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. Mimex Co., (2d Cir. 1942) 124 F. (2d) 986 at 990.
103 See discussion in Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a
Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 1213-1216 (1952).
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the unsettled problems which still remain and which perhaps are
unavoidable in an expanding economy. On the other hand, there
should be no mental distress merely because a particular decision
involving a new application of established doctrine seems to be
out of line with one's mm evaluation.
The limited time exclusiveness of patent rights is derived from
the tenet that it serves the public welfare to give such protection
to the patent grant as a mechanism for sustaining incentives to
invent, to disclose and to invest.104 When the many pieces of the
trends described in this paper are put together, it seems that we
are witnessing the beginning of a better perception of the role of
patent and antitrust policies i~ the total American economy. These
two arms of the preeminent policy of maintaining competition
presently appear to be in better equipoise. If we are in the cycle
where this wise middle course is being pursued, this is the time for
private parties and government to continue to support both "hard
core" protection of patents and strong but equitable enforcement
against "hard core" subversions of patents and antitrust policy.
This is also the time to continue to cast out ideologies at variance
with constitutional and statutory directives in both spheres of
policy. Particularly, there should be no retreat from the necessity
for inquiry into market facts and competitive market effects under
the Rule of Reason when the challenged conduct of the patentee
cannot "quickly and positively" be adjudged as unreasonable per
se in the limited number of such unequivocal situations.105
Government, business and the bar should join in solidifying
their common interest in this approach to patent-antitrust statecraft. The launching in February 1954 of The George Washington
University Patent, Trade-Mark and Copyright Foundation106 underscores the important task of research projects to fill factual gaps
regarding the structure, operations and accomplishments of the
Patent System. Pilot projects of the Foundation are now in process
on patent utilization, the·value of the patent in the United States,
the effect of patents on the creation and growth of small industrial
units, licensing of American patents and techniques in foreign
104For the author's beliefs, see note 98 supra. See WooD, PATENTS AND ANrrmusr
I.Aw (1942) and Wood and Johnson, "Patents and Antitrust Laws," UNIV. !LL. L. FORUM
544 (1950); Wood, "Patent Reform and 1943: Antitrust or Anti-Patent Law" II GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 473 (1943).
105 R.EPoRT, II, 86 and c. V.
lOBThe University has published a brochure on THE PATENT FOUNDATION and a pamphlet containing the terms of the DECLARATION OF TRusr EsrABLJSHING THE FOUNDATION.
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countries, and public attitude toward patents.107 As these and
other Foundation projects are completed, this fact supporting art
of legal and economic evaluation of significant phases of the American Patent System should contribute materially to a better understanding of this long existing institution of our society.
If the thesis of this paper has correctly evaluated the trends, it
may be concluded that patent~ and antitrust can lead a peaceful
coexistence. In that way, lawful private rights in patents and the
objectives of the antitrust laws can flourish side by side in fulfillment of the public interest.
101 These current pilot projects are described in the FouNDATION's RllPoRT No. 2 TO
MEMBERS AND DONORS, April 18, 1955.
A pioneer work on economic aspects is VAUGHAN, THE ECONOMICS OF OUR p ATENT
SYSTEM (1925). More recent are Forkosch, "The Economics of American Patent Law," 17
N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. R.Ev. 157,406 (1940); Abramson, "The Economic Bases of Patent Reform,"
13 LAW&: CONTEM. PROB. 339 (1948); BENNEIT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM (1943); and
the PRINCETON UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE ON QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE (1950).
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